

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 1479/1

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, CSCE, NATO

SUBJECT: CSCE: NAC CONSULTATIONS ON BREZHNEV LETTERS AND NATO
SUMMIT

REF: A) STATE 58915

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BEGIN SUMMARY: AT MARCH 17 SPECIAL NAC, BRITISH RAISED AND ALLIES DISCUSSED BOTH RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV CSCE LETTER AND POSSIBILITY OF NATO PRE-HELSINK I SUMMIT. MISSION DREW FULLY ON REFTELS. FRENCH PROPOSED RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV ALONG LINES PARA 4, PARIS 6720, BUT SAID THEY WOULD REPORT ALLIED CONCERNS ABOUT CITIATION OF SPECIFIC TIMING TO PARIS BEFORE GISCARD RESPONDS TO BREZHNEV ON MARCH 18. U.K. AND GERMAN REPLIES ARE IN LINE WITH PROPOSED U.S. RESPONSE. ITALIANS ARE ASTRIDE THE FENCE. ALLIED NOTED PRO'S AND CON'S OF PROPOSED NATO PRE-HELSINK SUMMIT AND AGREED TO STUDY MATTER FURTHER. END SUMMARY.

1. U.K. CHARGE (LOGAN) OPENED SUBSTANTIVE DISCUSSION IN MARCH 17 SPECIAL NAC BY NOTING BRITISH HAD CALLED FOR SESSION BECAUSE BREZHNEV'S CSCE LETTER REQUIRED URGENT REPLY. LOGAN NOTED THAT BREZHNEV'S LETTERS WERE DATED MARCH 8 AND THUS ARRIVED WHEN MANY HEADS OF GOVERNMENT AND FOREIGN MINISTERS WERE OTHERWISE OCCUPIED. HE ALSO OBSERVED THAT BREZHNEV'S LETTER --DETAILS OF WHICH HE CITED AS CONTAINED IN THE HAGUE'S 1324--WAS NOT YET KNOWN TO THE PUBLIC. KEY ITEM IN LETTER
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WAS SOVIET INTEREST IN CONVENING CSCE STAGE III AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL IN THE LAST DAYS OF JUNE "SAY, ON 30 JUNE."

2. FOR ITS OWN PART, U.K. FELT LITTLE DOUBT THAT A CSCE SUMMIT

WOULD BE HELD THIS SUMMER; BUT LEVEL OF PARTICIPATION AND TIMING STILL REPRESENTED IMPORTANT WESTERN NEGOTIATING LEVERAGE. U.K. THOUGHT IT UNWISE, THEREFORE, TO SET A DEFINITE NEGOTIATING DEADLINE FOR STAGE II AT THIS TIME. MOREOVER, THE NEUTRALS WOULD STRONGLY RESENT SUCH A "GUILLOTINE" PROVISIO. AT THE SAME TIME, LONDON FELT IT PROPER TO GIVE A FORTHCOMING REPLY TO BREZHNEV AND PROPOSED TO DRAW PRIMARILY ON THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE EC SUMMIT STATEMENT ON CSCE (DUBLIN 476). BRITISH WOULD BE PREPARED TO "POINT TOWEARD" STAGE III THIS SUMMER BUT PERHAPS AT A SOMEWHAT LATER DATE THAN THE ONE MENTIONED BY BREZHNEV; AND SUBJECT, OF COURSE, TO A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME ON REMAINING CSCE ISSUES.

3. RAISING THE POSSIBILITY OF A NATO SUMMIT MEETING PRIOR TO THE CSCE FINALE, U.K. REP SAID THE BRITISH HAD AN OPEN MIND ON THIS ISSUE. HOWEVER, THE JUNE CALENDAR WAS ALREADY CROWDED. SOME HAD DISCUSSED TURNING THE NATO SPRING MINISTERIAL INTO A SUMMIT SESSION SINCE SUCH A MEETING COULD BE MORE READILY PRESENTED AS SOMETHING MORE THAN A SUMMIT MEETING SOLELY RELATED TO CSCE. A NATO SUMMIT CALLED EXPRESSLY TO DISCUSS CSCE, OR EVEN THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUCH A MEETING, MIGHT WELL FORECLOSE ANY FURTHER SOVIET STAGE II CONCESSIONS. THIS PROBLEM MIGHT BE AVOIDED IF A NATO SUMMIT WERE CALLED TO CONSIDER OTHER DEVELOPMENTS AS WELL AS CSCE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ALLIES MUST RECOGNIZE THAT PRESSURES WILL MOUNT IN NATO FOR A SUMMIT OF THE FIFTEEN IF THE SOVIETS ANNOUNCE A PRE-HEL-SINKI WARSAW PACT SUMMIT.

4. FOLLOWING U.K. PRESENTATION ON BREZHNEV LETTER, AMBASSADOR BRUCE DREW FULLY ON TALKING POINTS IN REF. A. SINCE U.K. PREEMPTED DISCUSSION AT MARCH 18 PERM REPS LUNCH OF NATO SUMMIT MEETING, AMBASSADOR ALSO GAVE DETAILS OF U.S. POSITION ON SUBJECT AS CONTAINED REF. B.

5. AMBASSADOR DE ROSE (FRANCE) SAID PRESIDENT GISCARD WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER BREZHNEV'S LETTER ON MARCH 18 SINCE PRIME MINISTER CHIRAC WAS LEAVING FOR MOSCOW WITHIN 48 HOURS.

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GISCARD WANTED TO ANSWER BREZHNEV'S LETTER IN ADVANCE OF CHIRAC'S TRIP TO MOSCOW SO THAT THE BASIS FOR DISCUSSIONS BETWEEN HIM AND HIS SOVIET HOSTS COULD BE ESTABLISHED IN ADVANCE. ALTHOUGH DE ROSE SAID HE WOULD FULLY REPORT ALLIED REACTIONS TO PARIS, THE FRENCH RESPONSE WOULD PARALLEL THE EC 9 CSCE STATEMENT, WOULD BE SHORT AND WOULD UNDERLINE THAT SEVERAL IMPORTANT ITEMS REMAIN TO BE DECIDED AT GENEVA. MOREOVER, LETTER WOULD RECALL THAT AS PROMISED IN THE FRANCO-SOVIET MEETINGS AT RAMBOUILLET LAST DECEMBER, BOTH SIDES MUST INTENSIFY THEIR EFFORTS TO REACH AGREEMENT ON OUTSTANDING QUESTIONS. BALANCED RESULTS COULD BE ACHIEVED ONLY AFTER ALL PARTIES MADE THE PROPER CONTRIBUTION. IF ABOVE CRITERIA ARE MET, FRANCE COULD ENVISAGE THE SAME TIME FRAME PROPOSED BY BREZHNEV.

6. ON THE QUESTION OF A PRE-HELSINKI SUMMIT, DE ROSE SAID HE WAS WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS BUT WOULD SPEAK PERSONALLY ON THE BASIS OF HIS CONVERSATIONS WITH SENIOR OFFICIALS AT THE QUAI LAST SATURDAY. AS A FIRST REACTION, ALTHOUGH FRANCE SAW SOME ADVANTAGES TO SUCH A MEETING, THE DISADVANTAGES WOULD ALSO HAVE TO BE WEIGHED. AMONG THE LATTER, DE ROSE NOTED VISCOUNT DAVIGNON'S INJUNCTION TO THE NAC ON FEBRUARY 20 AGAINST FUELING PUBLIC EUPHORIA THAT A FINAL EUROPEAN PEACE SETTLEMENT HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AT HELSINKI. PERHAPS A WESTERN SUMMIT WOULD GIVE ADDED IMPETUS TO SUCH AN INTERPRETATION OF THE HELSINKI RESULTS. MOREOVER, IF THE ALLIES STRESSED THE SAME THINGS AT A SUMMIT THAT THEY WERE GOING TO SAY AT HELSINKI, THIS MIGHT SERVE ONLY TO DOUBLE THE IMPACT OF SUCH STATEMENTS ON ALLIED PUBLIC OPINION. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, THE ALLIES ARE CRITICAL OF THE CSCE RESULTS, WHICH ARE IN TURN PRAISED AT A SUBSEQUENT WARSAW PACT SUMMIT, THEN THE ALLIES WOULD BE CAST AS "POOR LOSERS." NOTWITHSTANDING THESE FACTORS, FRANCE WAS PREPARED TO STUDY THE NATO SUMMIT PROPOSAL, INCLUDING ITS ADVANTAGES AND DISADVANTAGES, IN THE COUNCIL.

7. RESPONDING TO DE ROSE, LUNS SAID THAT A COORDINATED ALLIED POSITION ON A PRE-HELSINKI SUMMIT MEETING WOULD, OF COURSE, BE NECESSARY. HE WOULD NOT, HOWEVER, RULE OUT THAT SUCH A SUMMIT MIGHT BE USEFUL IN DEFLECTING FALSE PUBLIC ENTHUSIASM ABOUT THE HELSINKI RESULTS.

8. FRG REP (BOSS) SAID THAT CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT ALSO WANTED TO
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REPLY ON MARCH 18 TO BREZHNEV'S LETTER AND WANTED TO BASE HIS REPLY ON THE MARCH 11 EC STATEMENT ON CSCE. SCHMIDT'S REPLY MIGHT MENTION A MID-SUMMER STAGE III IF SUFFICIENT PROGRESS IS MADE IN GENEVA. WITH REGARD TO A PRE-HELSINKI SUMMIT, THE FRG DEL HAD NO INSTRUCTIONS BUT AGREED THAT SUCH A PROPOSAL WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY STUDIED.

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9. AMBASSADOR CATALANO (ITALY) SAID ROME HAD RECEIVED BREZHNEV'S LETTER ONLY LATE FRIDAY NIGHT. HOWEVER, THE ITALIAN POSITION WAS ALREADY REFLECTED IN THOUGHTS EXPRESSED BY THE OTHERS; I.E., THE RESPONSE SHOULD BE BRIEF, REFLECT THE DUBLIN STATEMENT ON CSCE, AND PERHAPS, AS THE US SUGGESTED, SHOULD SET NO SPECIFIC DATE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE REPLY SHOULD NOT GO TOO STRONGLY AGAINST BREZHNEV'S WISHES. THUS, AS THE FRENCH REP SAID, THE HELSINKI SUMMIT COULD PERHAPS BE SCHEDULED AS BREZHNEV HAD SUGGESTED IF PROPER RESULTS ARE ACHIEVED IN GENEVA.

10. CONCERNING A PRE-HELSINKI SUMMIT, CATALANO SAID THE FOREIGN MINISTERS WOULD DOUBTLESS HAVE TO DISCUSS CSCE AT THEIR MINISTERIAL MEETING IN MAY. IF SUCH DISCUSSIONS WERE HELD AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL, THE NEGATIVE FEATURES MENTIONED BY AMBASSADOR DE ROSE MIGHT RECEIVE UNDUE EMPHASIS.

11. LUNS REJOINED THAT A HEADS OF GOVERNMENT MEETING NEED NOT TALK ONLY ABOUT CSCE. INDEED, IT WOULD BE HIGHLY UNLIKELY FOR HEADS OF GOVERNMENT NOT TO DISCUSS MANY OTHER ISSUES.

12. NELGIAN PERMREP (DE STAERCKE) UNDERSTOOD THE FRENCH DESIRE TO REPLY TO BREZHNEV BEFORE CHIRAC'S ARRIVAL IN MOSCOW. ALTHOUGH WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, DE STAERCKE QUESTIONED BEING AS SPECIFIC ABOUT THE DATE MENTIONED BY BREZHNEV AS THE FRENCH PROPOSED TO BE IN THEIR RESPONSE TO MOSCOW. SETTING EVEN AN APPROXIMATE DATE MIGHT BE CONTRATY TO NATO NEGOTIATING INTERESTS, AND CITING NATO PREREQUISITES MIGHT NOT PROVIDE SUFFICIENT GUARANTEES.

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13. CONCERNING A SUMMIT MEETING, DE STAERCKE SAID THAT WHILE WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS ALSO ON THIS MATTER, HE WAS AFRAID THAT SUCH A SESSION WOULD PERFORCE HACE TO EXPRESS EITHER DOUBTS ABOUT CSCE RESULTS OR SATISFACTION WITH THEM. IN A SENSE DE STAERCKE WONDERED IF A WESTERN SUMMIT MIGHT NOT CREATE RISKS EITHER BY FORCING THE ALLIES TO PRAISE THE GENEVA RESULTS OR TO DECLARE THEM UNSATISFACTORY. SUCH A RESULT WAS FAR FROM DAVIGNON'S MIND WHEN HE HAD SPOKEN TO THE COUNCIL ON FEBRUARY 20.

14. DUTCH AMBASSADOR (HARTOGH) AGREED THAT WERE RISKS IN BEING SPECIFIC ABOUT A DATE FOR CSCE STAGE III AT THIS TIME AND PREFERRED THE US AND UK FORMULATIONS ON THIS SUBJECT. HARTOGH AGREED THAT THE PROPOSED NATO SUMMIT REQUIRED FURTHER STUDY AND CITED THE POSSIBILITY OF AS MANY AS FOUR SUMMIT MEETINGS THIS SUMMER: NATO, EC-9, WARSAW PACT, AND HELSINKI STAGE III.

15. NORWEGIAN AMBASSADOR (BUSCH) THOUGHT SETTING FIRM DATES NOW MIGHT PLAY INTO SOVIET HANDS. OSLO, THEREFORE, FAVORED THE FORMULATION IN THE EC-9 DUBLIN STATEMENT.

16. TURKISH PERMREP (ERALP) SAID ANKARA SAW THE BREZHNEV LETTER AS A SOVIET TACTIC TO PUSH STAGE II TO A RAPID CONCLUSION SATISFACTORY TO THE EAST. TURKEY THUS PREFERRED THE FORMULATION IN THE EC-9 DECLARATION CALLING FOR AN UNSPECIFIED "EARLY DATE". "JUNE 30 OR THEREABOUTS, EVEN THOUGH QUALIFIED, MIGHT BE GOING TOO FAR." IN TURKEY'S MIND, EVEN THE HOLDING OF STAGE III AT THE SUMMIT LEVEL WAS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION AND REMAINED TO BE DECIDED IN LIGHT OF THE GENEVA RESULTS.

17. DANISH PERMREP (SVART) THOUGHT REPLY SHOULD BE POSITIVE AND MIGHT INCLUDE ELEMENTS IN THE RESPONSE OUTLINED BY THE FRENCH PERMREP, SUITABLY QUALIFIED SO AS NOT TO DEGRADE THE NATO NEGOTIATING POSITION IN GENEVA. SVART AGREED THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD STUDY THE PRO'S AND CON'S OF A PRE-HELSINKI SUMMIT. IT WAS UPPERMOST IN COPENHAGEN'S MIND TO AVOID ANUTHING SMACKING OF BLOCS OR CONFRONTATION BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

18. CANADIAN PERMREP (MENZIES) SAID OTTAWA HAD ALWAYS BELIEVED CSCE SHOULD CONTINUE UNTIL GOOD RESULTS COULD BE GUARANTEED. INDEED, SOME SILID RESULTS HAD BEEN ACHIEVED AND SETTING DEADLINES NOW MIGHT BRING THE RISK THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD DO NOTHING MORE
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IN GENEVA. ON THE OTHER HAND, BREZHNEV'S PARTICULAR STATUS MIGHT CALL FOR AN EFFORT ON THE ALLIED AS WELL AS ON THE SOVIETS' PART TOWARD A SATISFACTORY CSCE CONCLUSION. MENZIES HOPED THAT THE TWO FORMULATIONS ON TIMING PROPOSED COULD BE BROUGHT CLOSER TOGETHER WITH "PERHAPS MORE FUDGING ON A SPECIFIC DATE." THUS, THE FRENCH MIGHT SAY THEY WERE PREPARED TO PLAN FOR THE DATES MENTIONED BY BREZHNEV, IT WESTERN CONDITIONS EREE MET, BUT WERE UNABLE TO COMMIT THEIR ALLIES.

19. MANZIES BELIEVED OTTAWA WOULD FAVOR A NATO SUMMIT--TO INVOLVE THE NORTH AMERICAN PARTICIPANTS IN CSCE--PARTICULARLY IF OTHER SUMMIT MEETINGS WERE BEING HELD IN WHICH THEY WERE NOT PARTICIPANTS.

20. AMBASSADOR FISCHBACH (LUXEMBOURG) AGREED WITH THE BELGIAN PERMREP'S VIEW BOTH ON THE RESPONSE TO BREZHNEV AND ON A POSSIBLE NATO SUMMIT.

21. IN RESPONSE TO REQUESTS FOR CLARIFICATON ABOUT FRENCH INTENTIONS DE ROSE STRESSED THAT IT WAS NOT FRANCES INTENTION TO SETTLE NOW ON THE DATE MENTIONED BY BREZHNEV BUT TO STRESS THE HOPE THAT WESTERN PREREQUISITES COULD BE MET SO AS TO MAKE POSSIBLE A MEETING APPROXIMATELY ON THE DATE MENTIONED IN BREZHNEV'S LETTER.

22. BELGIAN PERMREP DE STAERCKE HOPED THE REPLY WOULD MAKE NO FIRM COMMITMENT ON DATES FOR STAGE 888. SINCE IT IS THE MORE NUANCED, THE LAST PARAGRAPH OF THE DUBLIN CSCE STATEMENT PROVIDED THE BEST FORMULATION ON THIS ISSUE. WHATEVER THE FRENCH RESPONSE, THE PROBLEM AFFECTS ALL THE ALLIES AND THEY SHOULD NOT THEREFORE,

PUT THEMSELVES IN A TRAP. SVART (DENMARK) AGREED, STRESSING THAT IT WAS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE THAT WESTERN CSCE CONDITIONS BE MET BEFORE FIRM DATES ARE DISCUSSED WITH THE EAST.

23. IN HIS SUMMARY, LUNS BELIEVED HE RECOGNIZED A CONSENSUS AGAINST AGREEMENT NOW ON THE JUNE 30 DATE SENT BY BREZHNEV. NEITHER, HOWEVER, COULDS SUCH A DATE BE EXCLUDED IF THE STAGE II OUTCOME WERE SATISFACTORY. ON THE PROPOSED NATO SUMMIT, LUNS SAW NO CLEAR PREFERENCE EITHER FOR OR AGAINST IT AT THIS TIME BUT NOTED ALLIED AGREEMENT THAT THE PROPOSAL NEEDED FURTHER STUDY. BRUCE.

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